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Importing Democracy
The invasion of Iraq by the US and its
allies has triggered a great number of
moral discussions about issues such as
whether democracy is the best system of
government for all countries, who decides
whether it is the best system, whether (or
in which cases) it is justified to impose it,
and if it is, which are the appropriate actors
to do so. Instead of going into these moral
questions, this article looks at the practical
side: once a party, such as the US, has
made the choice to introduce a democratic
system into a country by force, what are its
chances of success, and what are the fac-
tors determining the success or failure of
its mission?
The histories of Germany and Japan
since 1945 suggest that the forceful intro-
duction of democracy by external actors is
indeed possible. What made democracy
last in these countries? And can their expe-
rience be replicated in a different time,
place and historical context? 
Factors affecting the success of an
imported democratic system
A number of factors influence the success
or failure of democratizing missions. One
central factor is the acceptance of the sys-
tem by the population. A term that is often
used in this context is legitimacy. Defined
by Alfred Stepan as the voluntary accept-
ance of an arrangement of power by both
the rulers and the ruled, the latter of which
accept the actions of the rulers because
they see them as conforming to pre-estab-
lished norms, legitimacy embodies popular
support for (or acceptance of) a system. A
lack of legitimacy can constitute an impor-
tant weakness when a democratic system is
installed from the outside rather than
through an indigenous political process. 
Two types of legitimacy can be distin-
guished. The first has been called “deep”
legitimacy, which refers to an “intrinsic
value commitment rooted in the political
culture at all levels of society,” in other
words a widespread belief that democracy
is in principle the best form of government.
The second type of legitimacy is perform-
ance legitimacy, which means that public
acceptance of a system depends on its per-
formance in producing the desired outputs.  
Experience in democratization efforts
shows that popular support and legitimacy
are conditioned by a number of factors. For
example, deep legitimacy is affected by the
way the installer of the new system is per-
ceived. In the case of Iraq, the lack of inter-
national support for the Allied mission did
not go unnoticed in Iraq itself, and a UN
mission might have affected the legitimacy
of the system more positively. However,
there are many other factors that play a
role. Demonstration effects from events in
other countries, the potentially exemplary
role played by popular leaders, local tradi-
tions, and positive experiences with politi-
cal systems all have an impact on deep
legitimacy.
Constitutional design can also play a
role by influencing deep legitimacy. Aside
from the type of political system (parlia-
mentary versus presidential) and electoral
system (proportional representation versus
plurality) that is chosen, the process lead-
ing to the establishment of a constitution is
also important. Of central importance is
that the various population groups feel
they are represented in the groups of peo-
ple who draft the constitution. 
How does culture affect deep legitima-
cy? First of all, no culture is inherently
pro- or anti-democratic. Certainly, there
are values that, if widespread, exert a pos-
itive influence on the consolidation of
democracy. These include equality, con-
sensus, trust, pragmatism, dialogue, toler-
ance, willingness to compromise, and
accountability.  But these values exist in
many different cultures. Besides, cultures
and value systems are not monolithical and
unchanging phenomena. They are con-
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NOTES
1National missile defenses should probably be
included in the category of defense. For the pur-
poses of this article, however, I follow the cur-
rent administration policy of considering mis-
sile defenses as part of the military category
rather than as an element of homeland security.
2The federal government defines homeland
security as “a concerted national effort to pre-
vent terrorist attacks within the United States,
reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and
minimize the damage and recover from attacks
that do occur.”
3Some observers favor relying to a greater
extent on the international criminal justice sys-
tem to bring terrorists to justice. U.S. activities
toward that end cut across the three categories
described here. Much of their U.S. funding
would be related to the law enforcement activi-
ties of the defense category, however.
4Thus, my definition of prevention is a far cry
from the Bush administration's doctrine of “tak-
ing the fight to the enemy” through preventive
wars.
5That is to say, the combined three-year total
federal budget authority for the Department of
Defense (net of homeland security spending),
homeland security, and international affairs
(including counterterrorism accounts) in 2002,
2003, and 2004 was about $340 billion higher
than what it would have been if the initial 2001
budgets for those accounts were extended with
a boost for inflation each year. A bit less than
half of the new spending came through the
annual appropriations process; the remainder
came through emergency supplemental appro-
priations passed during September 2001 in
response to the terrorist attacks and during fis-
cal years 2003 and 2004 to pay for operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
6The Department of Defense figure excludes
DoD spending for homeland security, most of
which pays for beefing up security at military
installations in the United States.
7The new development aid program, called the
Millennium Challenge Account, was
announced by President Bush in a speech to the
United Nations Financing for Development
Conference in Monterrey, Mexico, March 22,
2002. The President's plan would raise U.S. for-
eign aid spending by $5 billion over a period of
five years. Spending for foreign aid was about
$11 billion in 2001.
8Several billion dollars of the $20 billion will go
toward defensive security measures, especially
physical protection of Defense Department
installations.
9The figure includes the annual appropriation
for 2004, plus the military and international
security shares of the 2004 emergency supple-
mental appropriation signed by President Bush
in November 2003. 
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stantly changing under the influence of
changing circumstances. Negative experi-
ences with dialogue or trust will reduce the
value of those things. Welfare, the devel-
opment of a civil society and the behavior
of influential leaders all affect cultural val-
ues. As Diamond et al. wrote, “[p]erhaps
the most important lesson our case studies
teach us about political culture is that it is
plastic and malleable over time.”  This
does not mean that value changes cannot
be influenced. Education and the media
play an important role in conveying cultur-
al values. 
Performance legitimacy is affected,
among other things, by economic develop-
ment. Indeed, research has shown a very
strong correlation between economic
development and democracy. Broad-based
development (as opposed to the kind of
narrow, elite-centered economic growth
that is characteristic of resource-rich coun-
tries including the oil states, in which the
power base of regimes is only strengthened
by their control over the oil incomes) also
influences the works in favor of democra-
cy more directly by creating economic
power bases outside the state and a gener-
ally pro-democratic middle class and civil
society. Civil society matters because it
generally promotes a politics of issues and
ideas rather than a politics of identity and
exclusion, which is often what is promul-
gated by ethnically or religiously-oriented
political parties.
A major factor: the rule of law
The importance of the rule of law can
hardly be exaggerated. It is part of any suc-
cessful and sustainable democracy. The
ultimate guarantees of a rule of law are a
strong and independent judiciary and an
uncorrupted, politically neutral and capa-
ble police force. Fighting corruption and
political influence in these sectors are
therefore indispensable elements of strate-
gies to install and consolidate democracy. 
In earlier democratizing missions, such
as those in Cambodia, Bosnia and Kosovo,
most attention was paid to the organization
of elections and it was insufficiently
understood that these would not work well
without a rule of law. This “failure to grasp
that democracy works only when it goes
hand in hand with the rule of law,” writes
Michael Ignatieff, was “one of the costliest
mistakes in the Balkans,” because “democ-
racy means little if it is not buttressed by a
separation of powers, an independent judi-
ciary and the rule of law. Democracy with-
out these constitutional supports just pro-
vides an opportunity for populist tyranny
and financial corruption.”
Ignatieff's conclusion is reinforced by
that of Paddy Ashdown, the British politi-
cian who led the Bosnian mission:
We thought that democracy was the
highest priority, and we measured it
by the number of elections we
could organize. The result even
years later is that the people of
Bosnia have grown weary of vot-
ing. In addition, the focus on elec-
tions slowed out efforts to tackle
organized crime and corruption,
which have jeopardized quality of
life and scared off foreign invest-
ment... In hindsight, we should
have put the establishment of the
rule of law first, for everything else
depends on it: a functioning econo-
my, a free and fair political system,
the development of civil society,
public confidence and the courts. 
The lesson, then, is that democratic
elections require a certain measure of
order, control and stability. In many cases,
including Iraq, these constitute major
problems. The recent decision to postpone
the Iraqi elections is therefore justifiable
and supported by democratization
researchers around the world.   
What should happen in Iraq?
It is clear that in Iraq there is still a long
way to go. The “deep legitimacy” of the
system that is being installed is lacking as
of yet because many people question the
legitimacy of the bringers of that system
and the way in which they operate.
“Performance legitimacy” lacks as well, as
reconstruction and stability are not yet
realized. Nevertheless it is important that
the country is not left in chaos and that the
establishment of the rule of law receives
top priority. 
“This then is the paradox: to build
democracy in Iraq the United States must
stay on, but to demonstrate that it is not a
colonial power it must leave,” writes
Fareed Zakaria. The solution? “Involving
other countries in the process” in order to
increase the legitimacy of the mission.
This appears to be what is being done in
Iraq at the moment, and in combination
with the gradual transfer of powers to Iraqi
bodies, this may increase the legitimacy of
the democratizing project. Another part of
the solution according to Zakaria is to
postpone elections until the rule of law has
been established. This advice, too, appears
to have been heard. 
In this way, democratization in Iraq is a
continuous compromise between represen-
tation and “ownership” on the one hand,
and stability and effectiveness on the other.
And after all, no successful democracy has
been created through purely democratic
means. Communication with the Iraqi peo-
ple, via the media, education and the pro-
duction of tangible results to increase per-
formance legitimacy, will have to sell the
compromise to the population. 
In the meantime the governors of Iraq
will benefit if they devote attention to the
factors (besides the establishment of a rule
of law) that influence the consolidation of
democratic systems. Installing democracy
is a process that is much more than just
political. Not only in political and military
decision making, but also when economic
and social measures are implemented
should the potentially democratizing effect
of such measures be understood and taken
into account. Thus, economic development
on a broad and local basis can have a
democratizing effect. Similarly, policies
aimed at education and the media can work
positively in the medium term by influenc-
ing political culture, enlarging social capi-
tal and giving the population a chance to
organize around issues (rather than identi-
ties) that are important to them. Truly
coherent policy, then, would mean that
each planned measure is checked for its
impact on factors such as the acceptance of
the political system by the population, the
shaping of democratic institutions, the rule
of law, political culture, economic devel-
opment, social capital, the character of
political parties, political leadership, the
role of the army, and external factors - and
via those factors on the consolidation of
the new democratic system.  
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